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• General comment on regulation
• A quick stock take of New Zealand’s state of play
• Where to from here?
Outline
• Regulation seeks and enforces specific outcomes
• Heavy regulation beyond contract and competition law moves towards 
central planning
• The debate about de-centralised vs centralised administration of an 
economy
– was over in the 1950/60s (most economists thought) and 
– evidence for the de-centralised approach were the revelations following 
Perestroika, and the performance of de-regulated “western” economies 
from the 1970s
Regulation and  Economic Planning
• Competitive tensions induce variety in new products and ways of doing 
things
• Competitive tensions arise in different markets
– Goods and services market
– Ownership market
– Labour including managerial market, and 
– Debt market
• Enhances dynamic efficiency (real economic growth), providing the 
(legal) rules of the game 
– Permit property rights: leading to rewards and accountability, and
– Have certainty attached to them
Competition is a major argument 
for a 
de-centralised economic system
Reason to Regulate: First Principles
– externalities: e.g. issues to do with public goods and the
environment 
– getting better performance where firms have market
power
– addressing hidden information problems
OECD: but only if regulation can improve 
performance
Reason to Regulate: Second Principles
The Supply and Demand of Regulation arising from
the State’s ability to coerce
Stigler & Becker
Regulated
Companies
Political
Interests
Special interest
groups
Regulators have their own interests 
Ensure affected parties are
“optimally disgruntled”
Consumers/investors: where do they fit in?
OECD: regulatory arrangements - political independence
Third Principle
A neglected element of regulatory 
design
(less) Competance/
Corruption =      M      + D         - A
Monopoly       Discretion    Accountability
How is New Zealand Regulating?
Differently from OECD Principles, the UK and Australia
• Regulation is typically not devolved to independent 
institutions ( employment arrangements/political 
connection) e.g.
– Telecommunications (period of appt.): 
– Electricity Commission (institutional location) 
• The objective of institutions is not at all clear e.g.
– Roading  (Is a cost-benefit analysis OK  for Transit analysis?) 
– Electricity Commission (both Regulator and Service Provider)
How is New Zealand Regulating?
• Limiting competition: e.g. health, insurance, education
• Extending regulation to activities that don’t “need” it: e.g. 
cooperative lines Co’s, state-owned entities without a profit max 
objective (Transpower)
• Extending the scope of regulation: e.g. the Commission 
extending Part IV of the Commerce Act beyond mimicking 
a competitive market by regulating for transfers even between 
firms
• Limiting the accountability of regulatory bodies vs the approach 
of Australia, UK and  the  USA that enable merit reviews.
How is New Zealand Regulating?
Electricity Lines
• The Commission set price/quality thresholds that 
must be breached
• On breach, the Commission could choose to control: 
it has assessed price control for Unison, and Vector.
• In evaluating control it suggested that it would set 
prices according to ODV regulation. The idea is that 
the prices would be those of an efficient replacement 
firm (entrant).
Commission’s Evaluations of Regulation Have not Been 
Good Practice
• ODV is a hypothetical model and its prices were not checked for 
reality. Prices have failed the cash flow test.
• Issues (e.g. tax/asset purchases) inserted into its hypothetical model 
set prices below what any standalone efficient entrant could possibly 
charge
• In various of its analyses it has,
– virtually ignored the risk that ODV regulation implies for the firm 
(some change in 2007):
– Placed no weight on uncertainty in the estimates of ODV;
– insisted on a wacc with errors;
– would not evaluate forward-looking decisions using a proper, 
standard, investment tool;
– confused discounting the future with compounding the past;
– etc
How is New Zealand Regulating?
Lines Companies
• Unison and the Commission reached a settlement that 
was not the Commission’s suggested regulatory 
approach: 
• Vector settlement unknown?
Regulatory implementation Issues Arise Elsewhere 
e.g. in telecommunications 
in RMA decision-making
in the presentation of data (OECD league tables)
How is New Zealand Regulating?
Investment has been affected
• Access, and ex post, regulation in telecommunications
• Transpower has (legitimately) complained of this effect 
of ODV regulation
• The threat of takings associated with scooping off 
“functional profits” is sufficient to reduce investment 
• Demonstrated in forestry
• Demonstrated in cash flow analysis of lines companies
• Demonstrated in cost-benefit analysis of gas regulation
Where To From Here?
• The review of part IV of the Commerce Act has been stimulated in
large part by the interpretations and process of the Commission
• Some proposals for change lack recognition that the form of 
regulation and the inputs to regulation are jointly determined and 
cannot be assigned to separate layers of administration;
• Some officials seem to want “The Minister” involved in price setting;
• A limited merit review arrangement is a debated possibility.
The (OECD) process for regulation on first 
principles seems in abeyance 
Competition rather than central planning is 
desirable
Merit review processes for many regulatory 
institutions would be desirable
More Generally
